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The economic opening of China that Deng Xiaoping called for in thelate 1970s contributed to strong and sustained economic growth (theaverage increase in GDP approached a regular 10% annually between
1980 and 2014 (1)), allowing a quadrupling of income per capita from 1990
to 2006, and a doubling between 2006 and 2014. This rate of income
growth was accompanied by a spectacular reduction in poverty and an
overall improvement in health, which was nonetheless not as marked as in
the Maoist period when progress had been very impressive. For example,
life expectancy at birth rose from 35 to 65 years between 1949 and 1975,
but “only” rose from 67 to 75 years between 1981 and 2014. Over the latter
period, other countries performed better, with lower rates of GDP growth.
These developments were however accompanied by large increases in social
inequality. In the field of health provision, the rural population’s access to
care came up against a real financial barrier right from the early years of
the establishment of “market socialism.”
In the 1960s, the poor health of the rural population and the bias towards
the cities to the detriment of the rural areas led the government to launch
a huge healthcare programme based on the short-term training of “barefoot
doctors” and the establishment of rural medical co-operative programmes.
The nationwide emphasis on basic healthcare enabled China, with its es-
sentially rural population (74% in 1990 (2)), to obtain health indicators well
above expectations for its level of income per capita.
However, from the mid-1980s onwards, as a result of several factors such
as the ageing population, the withdrawal of the state from the health sector,
and the lower efficacy and efficiency of the health system, the gap between
China and the middle income countries narrowed. Between 1990 and 2004,
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Health Insurance Reforms and
Health Policies in Rural China
MARTINE  AUDIBERT,  X IAOXIAN HUANG,  X IEZHE HUANGFU,  
JACKY MATHONNAT,  AURORE PÉL ISS IER,  AND LAURÈNE PETITFOUR
ABSTRACT: Since the early 2000s, the Chinese government has undertaken a series of reforms in the health sector. Among these, the three
most important have been concerned with medical insurance, hospital administration, and pharmaceutical policies. The aims of these reforms
were to extend health insurance coverage, to increase the activities and the efficiency of the health establishments, and to improve patient
care. This article focuses on two components of these reforms: the development of health insurance in rural areas and the policy on essential
medicines in conjunction with hospital reforms. Our longstanding co-operation with a research team from Weifang University and with the Wei-
fang Health Bureau allowed us to follow these reforms and collect data (primary source) from a sample of township hospitals from Weifang
Prefecture. Those data allowed us to study their effects on health facilities' level of activity and efficiency. This article provides an overview of
studies we carried out on these issues over the period from 2000 to 2012. Our analyses were mainly based on non-parametric models (Data En-
velopment Analysis, Malmquist Index, and partial frontiers) and impact analyses, coupled with interviews with hospital staff and medical au-
thorities. Results show that the development of health insurance in rural areas had a positive effect in greatly increasing the activities of the
hospitals covered by our study. On the other hand, it did not have a positive influence on their efficiency, which declined in the period concer-
ned. This result is to be explained by the fact that, even though staff activity increased, it remained low, since the observed increase in activity
was not sufficient to make up for the parallel increase in staff numbers. Similarly, reforms in the hospital and pharmaceutical sectors had no
effect on the township hospitals of our survey. In fact, in order to compensate for the observed reduction of hospital resources following the in-
troduction of the reforms, on the one hand the government increased the subsidies allocated to township hospitals, and on the other hand the
hospitals strongly innovated in sophisticated and expensive care, to the benefit of a relatively small number of patients. Therefore, there were
some very positive steps forward, but they still call for a more nuanced assessment of the effects of the reforms.
KEYWORDS: Technical efficiency, non-parametric approach, Malmquist Index, township hospitals, health insurance, hospital and pharmaceu-
tical reforms, China, Weifang Prefecture.
the share of public expenditure to total health expenditure fell from 25%
to 17%, whereas the share of out-of-pocket expenditure by Chinese house-
holds rose from 36% to 53%. (3) By studying the access to healthcare by
the rural population of China over the periods’ 1989-1993 and 2004-2006,
based on CHNS data, we have shown that consumption by the poorest
households was significantly affected by the financial burden falling on
them, thereby widening the inequality gap. (4)
Being aware of this situation and the underlying discontent of the popu-
lation, since 2003 the Chinese government has undertaken a deep reform
of health policy and of the health system. It will take place through several
successive stages, (5) along three main axes: the development of health in-
surance and movement towards universal coverage (UHC), the reform of
the hospital sector, and the restructuring of drug policies. Thus, one can see
a willingness to improve not only the quality of care and the effectiveness
of the health system, but also for several years now, and especially since
2009, its efficiency. Indeed, in many areas and at different levels of the
health pyramid, the inefficiency of the system is a matter of concern, even
if the concept of efficiency does not necessarily appear to be a goal unan-
imously shared by all the stakeholders, nor always clearly understood at the
local authority level.
This article is concerned with the effects of the vast field of reforms al-
ready mentioned: health insurance in rural areas (the “New Rural Coopera-
tive Medical System - NRCMS), hospital and pharmaceutical policies, and
the resources, performance, and efficiency of the township hospitals (xi-
angzhen weishengyuan (6)). Township hospitals constitute the basic level of
the Chinese healthcare system. In Chinese terminology, they form part of
the first level in the health pyramid.
Methodology
Here we set out the principal methods used in the various studies to which
we refer. There are some additional elements in the annexes.
Samples and Data
We have studied the consequences of the successive reforms undertaken
in the rural areas of Weifang Prefecture, which is located roughly in the cen-
tre of Shandong Province, and is ranked third among Chinese provinces in
terms of per capita income. The per capita GDP in Weifang Prefecture –
whose population is around 9.5 million residents – is estimated at $6,000
for 2014 as compared with $7,500 for the province as a whole. The prefec-
ture is subdivided into 12 health districts. Our studies for the period 2000
to 2012 focused on a sample of 24 township hospitals (TH) and concerned
specifically health insurance in rural areas. This was expanded later to 30
hospitals to study the effects of the new drug policy on THs. Hospitals were
selected from a stratified random sample on the per capita income of the
township to which they belong, following a footstep proportional to the
size of the district population. The 24 hospitals initially selected are dis-
tributed across six districts; the six additional hospitals are taken from two
other districts. The samples represent 14% and 17% respectively of all
township hospitals in Weifang Prefecture.
Data and information were gathered over the 2000-2012 period by using
a framework drawn up by the authors, filled in by the Franco-Chinese team
at the studied hospitals and at the different administrative levels of the
county, township, and the corresponding NRCMS offices. Administrative
data were collected at the statistics and finance offices of the townships
and counties in charge of the hospitals in the study, and include general in-
formation (population size, per capita income, county area, etc.), and infor-
mation relative to insurance (date of the introduction of the NRCMS,
coverage rate, rate and amount of reimbursements). The data collected at
the hospital level were from computerised and non-computerised hospital
registers. They cover hospital resources (staff, beds, equipment, subsidies,
and other financial resources) and activities (external consultations, hospi-
talisations, vaccinations, laboratory tests, radiology, etc.). Additional quali-
tative data were gathered via semi-informal face-to-face interviews, based
on questionnaires, with the hospital directors and their close collaborators,
as well as with the management team of the prefectural health bureaus.
The aim was to get an accurate idea of the way hospitals are managed, and
of how the directors and their team reacted to the different reforms, some
of which had to entail severe restraints on a TH’s income.
The concept of efficiency comes down to raising the question of the best
use of resources to achieve a certain production by focusing either on the
costs of production (allocative efficiency) or on the quantities produced or
used (technical efficiency). This study focuses on technical efficiency, which
is measured more precisely by the capacity to obtain maximum production
(here, hospital activity) without any increase in available resources (the so-
called output orientation model), or else to obtain a given level of produc-
tion by using the least possible resources (input orientation model).
The technical efficiency of the township hospitals was assessed by using
non-parametric Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to study the effects of
health insurance in rural areas, and order-m (7) partial frontier efficiency for
the study of the hospital and pharmaceutical reforms. The assumption of
the variable returns to scale instead of constant returns to scale is retained,
as it is more relevant when the size of the hospitals and the managerial ca-
pabilities (8) are taken into account (for further methodological details, see
Annex 1).
The missions of township hospitals in China are to deliver both curative
and preventive health care, for which they receive specifically allocated re-
sources. Due to their multiple activities in both the curative and the preven-
tive field, we computed a composite output index. Since hospitals have little
room for choice over some of their resources (staffing, mainly), we opted
for an output orientation approach for calculating the efficiency scores.
In order to study the effects of health insurance we have calculated two
models of efficiency (one for the curative activities and the other for the
preventive ones). The available data cover a fairly long period (2000-2008),
marked by a progressive introduction of rural health insurance. We identified
three sub-periods: 2000-2002 (before the introduction of the reforms),
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4. Martine Audibert, Yong He, and Jacky Mathonnat, “Two-Period Comparisons of Healthcare De-
mand with Income Growth and Population Aging in Rural China: Implications for Adjustment of
the Healthcare Supply and Development,” Études et Documents, CERDI, No. 15, 2013.
5. Jacky Mathonnat, Martine Audibert, Xiezhe Huangfu, Anning Ma, and Laurène Petitfour, “Progrès
et défis pour trois réformes majeures dans le système de santé chinois” (Progress and challenges
for three major reforms in the Chinese health system), Mondes en développement, Vol. 2, No.
170, 2015, pp. 105-121.
6. The township is the first level of administration just above the village. Next comes the county
(xian), then the prefecture (diqu), followed by the province (sheng). See Isabelle Thireau, “Editorial,”
China Perspectives, No. 2013/1, p. 6.
7. Catherine Cazals, Jean-Pierre Florens, and Léopold Simar, “Nonparametric Frontier Estimation a
Robust Approach,” Journal of Econometrics, No. 106, 2002, pp. 1-25.
8. Rowena Jacobs, Peter Smith, and Andrew Street, Measuring Efficiency in Healthcare, New York,
Cambridge University Press, 2006.
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2003-2005 (introduction and implementation of the reforms), and 2006-
2008 (consolidation). To take account of the specific nature of each sub-
period, both models were assessed for each sub-period. For each TH and for
each model (curative and preventive), three efficiency scores were calcu-
lated (see Annex 1).
The variables considered, the same for each of the sub-periods, are as fol-
lows:
l For the curative model:
– Output: a composite index, including outpatient visits, inpatients,
home visits, emergencies, laboratory tests, and X-ray examinations, was
built using weightings (cf. Annex 2a);
– Input (resources): number of medical staff, administrative staff, avail-
able beds, and a composite equipment index, computed from the prin-
cipal component analysis (PCA, cf. Annex 2b).
l For the preventive model:
– Output: a composite index, including both compulsory and non-
compulsory vaccinations, was built using weightings (cf. Annex 2a);
– Input: the number of medical and administrative staff assigned to
these activities.
A Malmquist Index, allowing the assessment over time of the proportion
of changes in efficiency resulting from changes in the technical process and
from “pure” technical efficiency, was computed (cf. Annex 1). 
Concerning the study of the effects of reform of hospitals and of phar-
maceutical policies, an efficiency model was estimated for the period 2002-
2006. The output variable is a composite index of global activity (curative
and preventive), built by using the Principal Component Analysis – PCA (cf.
Annex 2b). Inputs (or resources) considered are hospital staff, number of
available beds, and the Composite Index of Equipment (built using PCA, cf.
Annex 2b).
2003-2009: Development of health
insurance in rural areas, and performance
and efficiency of first-level health facilities
Context
In order to compensate for their reduced resources after the withdrawal
of the state from the health sector, health facilities had to resort to charging
their users, if not to balance their accounts then at least to maintain a man-
ageable level of deficit. Gradually a profit motive emerged in those estab-
lishments, leading the cost of care to rise faster than per capita income.
Moreover, relying on market-inspired elements in the Chinese economic re-
forms led to the closure of many state enterprises and the disappearance
of agricultural co-operatives in favour of the family responsibility system,
which in turn brought on the collapse of the social security scheme. By the
end of the 1980s, less than 5% of the rural population were covered by
health insurance, against over 95% in the late 1970s. The households were
faced with an expensive health system, well beyond the reach of the poorest
and severely degraded in terms of quality of care, which was especially no-
ticeable in rural areas (in village health stations as well as township hospi-
tals). (9)
The first substantial reform initiated by the government was then to re-
build insurance coverage in the rural areas. In 2003, the new rural coopera-
tive medical system (NRCMS), mentioned above, was progressively
established. Its aim was to cover the whole of the rural population by 2009
so as to improve their health status by lowering financial barriers to health-
care access. The system is based on three principles:
- Tripartite financing: premiums paid by households, and subsidies from
local governments (districts and regions) and from the central state;
- Improvements in the quality of healthcare at the first level of the health-
care system;
- Strong commitment by the central government and by local govern-
ments. The latter are responsible for implementing the directives issued
from the central level for improved results, with potential important impli-
cations for the personal career prospects of those in charge of piloting the
reform at the various levels of the system.
In parallel with better access to healthcare, the central government ex-
pected the reform to rationalise the care system by transferring part of the
demand from the overloaded hospitals at the upper levels down to the pri-
mary level (village health stations and township hospitals).
Progression of the activity
The analysis of our data shows that the development of the NRMCs has
greatly increased TH activities, both curative and preventive. (10) The total
number of outpatients in the 24 THs in the study remained stagnant be-
tween 2000 and 2005, but rose sharply (+77%) between 2005 and 2008,
increasing from 650,000 to 1,115,000. The same applies to inpatients,
whose number was relatively stable at the beginning of the period, but more
than doubled, from 25,000 to more than 50,000 after 2006, when every
district had fully introduced the health insurance measures. The effect of
the insurance scheme shown on these indicators was confirmed by an
econometric analysis and by a double-difference impact analysis. Three in-
dicators were selected to represent health insurance and its penetration: a
binary variable to show whether health insurance was introduced in the
township, the proportion of the township population covered, and the re-
imbursement rate of hospital care for external consultations and hospital-
isations. Whichever indicator was selected, the results of the econometric
analysis show that the introduction of NRCMS had a beneficial effect on
the volume of activity undertaken by the hospitals. This effect was more
marked for inpatients (44%) than for external consultations (16%). This re-
sult matches the expectations of the authorities, whose efforts on reim-
bursement were more focused on hospitalisations than on external
consultations. The effect on outpatient visits was greater in the poor town-
ships than in the rich ones, which is also what the authorities wished to
achieve. But this difference in favour of the poor has not been observed for
inpatients.
The impact analysis confirms the results of the econometric analysis and
gives grounds for saying that the increased volume of activity is indeed at-
tributable to health insurance, particularly with regard to hospitalisations
and lengths of stay. Compared with the hospitals that have not yet adopted
the reform measures, those located in the townships that did adopt reforms
have seen their hospitalisation rate increase by 58% and the bed occupancy
rate by 25%.
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9. Arousing strong discontent in the population: IBM Business Consulting Services, “Healthcare in
China: Toward Greater Access, Efficiency and Quality,” 2006, www-935.ibm.com/services/
us/imc/pdf/g510-6268-healthcare-china.pdf (accessed on 11 October 2016).
10. Martine Audibert, Xiaoxian Huang, Jacky Mathonnat, Aurore Pélissier, Ningshan Chen, and Anning
Ma, Analysis of the Effects of the New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme on the Activity, Financ-
ing and Efficiency on a Sample of Township Hospitals in Weifang Shandong Province PR China,
CERDI Report, 2011 (directed by Jacky Mathonnat).
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The econometric analysis has also confirmed the strategic role of the au-
thorities in the allocation of resources. One of our results concerns the neg-
ative relationship between population density and hospital activity. Our
discussions with the authorities suggest that there has been a deliberate
strategic policy to oversize the hospitals in the most densely populated
areas in the expectation of a large increase in future demand. 
The development of health insurance has had a positive effect on the hos-
pitals’ performance, measured in terms of staff productivity. There was an
increase between the beginning and the end of the period under review, but
it has remained weak: the productivity of the curative medical staff (leaving
aside public health activities) has risen from less than three patients per
day per medical staff to five (see Graph 1).
Although there was already an observed increase in preventive activity at
the beginning of the period, this trend consolidated considerably after 2005,
showing that the directives for public health adopted at that level of the
pyramid were swiftly implemented (Graph 2). However, detailed analysis
per hospital displays a mixed outcome, with some hospitals showing no
change in their activities while there was a vigorous increase in activity in
others. Our results are in line with those from other studies that confirm
that the introduction of the new scheme health insurance has led to an
overall increase in hospital activity by facilitating access to care. (11)
Health insurance and hospital efficiency
Contrary to our observations on activity, the results show that the NRCMS
had no effect, or even a negative effect, on the technical efficiency of the THs,
regardless of the type of activity (curative or preventive). The average efficiency
score, which was already relatively low before the establishment of the NRCMS
(for example, taken altogether the hospitals would have been able to increase
their average curative activity by 30% and their preventive activity by 40%
without additional resources), fell further with each sub-period: after the im-
plementation of the insurance system, hospitals would have been able to in-
crease their curative activity by an average of 50% and their preventive activity
by 65% without additional resources. (12) Moreover, as Graph 3 shows, the num-
ber of efficient hospitals fell over the period, while there was a rise in the num-
ber of relatively very inefficient ones (those with a score of less than 60%).
It would seem that this weak performance is the outcome of financial con-
straints being softened by the development of the NRCMS, which allowed
more resources to be allocated to the hospitals through the increase in their
activity. In case of soft financial constraints, the hospital directors were not
motivated to improve their management practices. The analysis of the total
factor productivity (TFP, measured by the Malmquist Index) by separating,
within the total technical efficiency, the amount due to the innovation from
the amount due to managerial capabilities of the management team, allowed
us to go deeper into the analysis. We noted that the TFP remained stable over
the period 2001-2005. A detailed breakdown of this result shows that the hos-
pitals that innovated did not seek to improve their pure technical efficiency.
By contrast, those that did not innovate sought to improve their pure technical
efficiency. In more concrete terms, during the pre-reform period, the total fac-
tor productivity did not change, the technical progress having rather dimin-
ished, whereas in the second period, the technical progress increased. After
2006 (the reform consolidation period), there was a stronger increase to be
observed in the total factor productivity. This was mainly due to technical
progress, which had increased even more rapidly. However, even though staff
productivity increased, it remained low, as we have mentioned above.
The successes and challenges facing health insurance
in rural areas
The main characteristics of the effects of the NRCMS that we have ob-
served and assessed on the basis of our work in Weifang Prefecture are
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Graph 1 – Ratio of the number of consultations
and hospitalisations to curative staff number 
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Graph 2 – Evolution of preventive activities in the
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Source: Authors’ calculations
largely confirmed by studies conducted in other Chinese provinces on these
issues. (13)
Although these reforms have been a success in several respects, they have
been less so in others. The first success, and a remarkable one, was the rapid
and decisive move by households to join the NRCMS, even though joining
was voluntary: (14) from 5% coverage of households before the reforms, the
rate reached 95% in 2008. The second success was the large increase in TH
activity, which as we have seen was an expected outcome; it raised the rate
of patient contact through external consultations from 0.6 before the re-
forms to 0.83 afterwards. 
However, not all the reform’s objectives were achieved. The literature
shows that insurance cover across all the rural households was not sufficient
in itself to avoid catastrophic health costs and to make significant improve-
ments in health status, as long as out-of-pocket payments fell heavily on
the poor and as long as the quality of care did not show significant im-
provement.
The first response by the government to this situation was a steady in-
crease in the subsidies granted to the NRCMS – from 10 yuan when they
were launched, the subsidies rose to 320 yuan in 2014 – followed by a rise
in the reimbursement rates and an expansion of the range of benefits. A
second major reform followed in 2009, namely that of the hospitals and
pharmaceutical policy.
2009-2012: The reform of the hospitals and
the pharmaceutical policy
In 2009, the government initiated a new wave of reforms aimed at uni-
versal health coverage by 2020. Care quality continued to preoccupy the
authorities. The care provided by the township hospitals was judged to be
poor by households who avoided them in favour of second-level hospitals,
leading to their being overloaded. Moreover, despite the controls over the
price of medicines set up between 1992 and 2007, the financial withdrawal
of the state from the health sector had gradually pushed health facilities
towards the profit motive, leading to widespread over-prescription and ir-
rational use of medicine. The strategy adopted by the hospitals for bypassing
the controls was to limit the use of essential fixed-price medicines (listed
in 1992) in favour of medicines without price restrictions. This made these
medicines more expensive for the patients and more profitable for the hos-
pitals, which were both prescribers and suppliers. (15)
The declared aim of the 2009 pharmaceutical reform was to restrict the
cost of care by acting on the price of medicines and on over-prescription. It
gave rise to an expected fall in care costs borne by the patient, and an im-
provement in care quality. It also helped to alleviate the burden for district
hospitals by encouraging a transfer of the demands on them towards the
township hospitals. This was intended to improve the efficiency of the THs,
which was low as we have emphasised. But as long as the authorities do
not increase resources in staff and equipment (such as beds) after the ob-
served increase in activity that must follow the reform, the result is a greater
production of services with the same resources, which will bring about a de
facto improvement in efficiency.
This reform has four aspects: the production of medicines, the fixing of
prices, the modalities for providing and paying for the care structures, and
the rationalising of prescriptions. A new list of essential medicines has been
drawn up. It came into force in 2012 and includes 317 medicines produced
by the pharmaceutical industry, 203 by traditional Chinese medicine, and a
certain number of plants with “recognised” medicinal properties. (16) In order
to take account of the specific needs of the different provinces, local gov-
ernments may add a supplementary list. For example, in Shandong Province
a further 216 medicines were added. Essential medicines are sold at cost
price, (17) because the primary healthcare facilities no longer have the right
to sell them for a profit ‘(“zero mark-up” policy). Moreover, these medicines
are the only ones that such facilities are allowed to prescribe. When care
delivery specifically requires the use of non-essential medicines, the patient
has to be referred to the district hospital or to buy drugs on the market. In
this way the de facto link between hospital income and staff income, which
had emerged because of hospitals’ ability to increase their revenue through
the sale of medicines without price controls, was broken once staff were
no longer motivated to over-prescribe. To make up for the loss of resources
linked to the sale of medicines, different mechanisms for compensation
have been put in place, each district being able to choose the modality that
suits it best. They are: compensation paid exclusively by government sub-
sidies, an incentive system such as payments related to measurable results,
the development of supporting activities (laboratory tests, and X-ray ex-
aminations) from which the hospital gets a share, or a mixture of several of
these methods. Finally, in accordance with the desire to emphasise public
health, the functions of the township hospitals were strengthened by the
development of preventive activities (targets for vaccination numbers, fol-
lowed by targets for children and the elderly to be given health checks and,
where necessary, home visits) and more demanding supervision of health
stations.
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The strategies of the township hospitals
Descriptive analysis of the data we gathered (18) highlights shifts in the
township hospitals’ resources, both human and physical, over the period
studied (2006-2012). The township hospitals’ staff establishment falls into
two categories: “in quota” and “extra quota.” The number of staff in the
quota is calculated and approved jointly by the Ministry of Human Re-
sources and the Social Security Office at the provincial level, and salaries
are paid out of the government budget. Staff outside of the quota are re-
cruited by the hospitals, either because the quota could not be filled (19) or
because the hospitals want to recruit additional staff, and these are paid
out of hospital funds. Our analyses show that overall staff numbers
did increase, but more before the reforms than during them, with
gaps between the different hospitals widening under the reforms
(Graph 4). The analysis of this evolution in terms of staff status
shows that, with some exceptions, the growing numbers of in-quota
staff followed overall growth in staff numbers. The same applies to
the number of beds, which rose sharply (from 44 in 2006 to 77 in
2012) (Graph 5). It should be noted that differences between hospi-
tals increased as much in staff numbers as in the provision of beds.
One of the problems facing the central authorities is the increase,
which may well be disproportionate, of hi-tech equipment in town-
ship hospitals. On the other hand, the acquisition of such equipment
may be attractive to potential patients. Our interviews make clear
the analytical importance of taking into account the ability or will-
ingness of the hospitals to make investments, which are key to their
technical level and to some extent to their attractiveness, as well as
to performance in terms of efficiency. According to the accountancy
rules in force, the value of their equipment reflects partly the value
of the hospital’s investment and partly its technical level. A threshold
of 10,000 yuan has been set by the National Committee for Health
and Family Planning (ministry of health) as the criterion that distin-
guishes commonly used equipment from so-called hi-tech equip-
ment.
The average level of equipment acquisition, measured as previously
by a composite index, increased throughout the period of the study,
although the pace of investment slowed after the reform. This up-
ward tendency varies according to the hospital concerned, some
having reduced their investments while others increased them
(Graph 6). Moreover, the average overall value of hi-tech equipment
in the 30 hospitals studied more than doubled in constant value
(730,200 yuan in 2006, and 1,768,600 yuan in 2012). The value of
this type of equipment varies enormously from one hospital to an-
other, and the differential between hospitals (standard deviation/av-
erage) became increasingly marked over the period.
These results, which throw light on the strategy of township hos-
pitals, are also emphasised in other studies. (20) Beyond medical rea-
sons, there are financial considerations that encourage investment
in hi-tech equipment whose costs are not framed.
The effect of the reform on the resources and
activity of the hospitals (21)
One of the aims in establishing a list of essential medicines and in
forbidding the sale of medicines for profit was to reduce the cost of care.
That aim seems to have been achieved. In the hospitals studied, the income
from medicines per outpatient and inpatient fell by around 50% between
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18. Martine Audibert, Xiezhe Huangfu, Jacky Mathonnat, and Laurène Petitfour, The Chinese Drug
Policy Reform: Analysis of the Activity and the Efficiency of Township Hospitals in the Shandong
Province, CERDI Report, 2016.
19. One of the reasons brought up during our interviews is that the salaries offered by the government
are not attractive enough to recruit qualified staff.
20. Karen Eggleston, Li Ling, Mengue Qingyue, Magnus Lindelow, and Adam Wagstaff, “Health Service
Delivery in China: A Literature Review,” Health Economics, No. 17, 2008, p. 149; Ying Chu Ng, “The
Productive Efficiency of Chinese Hospitals,” China Economic Review, No. 22, 2011, pp. 428-439.
21. Martine Audibert et al., The Chinese Drug Policy Reform: Analysis of the Activity and the Efficiency
of Township Hospitals in Shandong Province, op. cit.
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Graph 4 – Evolution in the distribution of the average
number of overall staff in hospitals studied between
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Source: Authors’ calculations. Graphics using “moustachioed boxes” are useful for representing
several distinct features of a distribution at the same time. The lower and upper limits of the
shaded areas represent respectively the upper and lower quarters of the values in the sample,
and the horizontal lines show the median. The “moustaches”: the horizontal lines at the ex-
tremities of the vertical lines that prolong the shaded areas are the highest and the lowest val-
ues. The points above the moustaches (Graphs 5 and 8) are the uppermost values. This gives a
good overall view of the annual distribution in the series.
Graph 5 – Distribution of the number of available
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2009 and 2012. This shift caused by the reform is quite clear (Graph 7). All
things being equal, the result is a potential reduction in expenditure on
medicine, that is to say savings (equal to a positive gain) for the patients
and for the health system. We have estimated the savings at 60% of what
the expenditure would have been if there had been no reform. In parallel
with this, the amount of reimbursement for hospitalisation has risen greatly.
In 2012 it was two to four times higher, depending on the district, than in
2008. The situation is a bit different for external consultations because there
is huge range of variation according to district: in some districts the amount
of reimbursement made great progress over the period, but in others it stag-
nated immediately after 2009.
As was the case in the previous period, the curative activity (22) of the hos-
pitals expanded greatly. The average annual number of external consultations
per hospital doubled from 30,000 in 2006 to 60,000 in 2012. The number of
hospital admissions likewise increased steadily in the same period, rising from
an average of 1,500 per hospital in 2006 to nearly 3,400 in 2012. However,
our analysis of changes in the share of admissions shows an increasing in-
equality between hospitals (Graph 8). One part of this growth in demand
arose from the transfer of patients who, instead of being handled by the more
expensive district hospitals as in the past, were now channelled more towards
township hospitals. This was because of the lower cost of medicines, the better
management of insurance, and the perceived (and objective) improvement
in the quality of care. Another part of this increase in demand arose because
some patients, who for reasons of affordability would have given up seeking
health care before the reform, now became “new entrants.” Finally, our inter-
views have revealed that village health units, having been placed directly
under the township hospital authorities, are referring more patients to them.
We have seen how the hospitals could choose a form of compensation
among possible options to reach a sustainable level of resources after losses
due to the prohibition on selling medicines for profit. Among these options
is the development of supplementary activities, such as laboratory tests,
sonar tests, X-rays, and electrocardiography. These activities developed over
the period of the study, and were anticipated by increasing investment in
equipment. As we noted above, the price of these activities with a relatively
high technological content was not covered by the reform, and THs can
make a profit in delivering the related services. This raises the question as
to whether the increase in “high-tech” services is
always strictly justified on medical grounds, espe-
cially as there is a significant willingness to pay for
such services, and a well-known information asym-
metry between care providers and patients.
The effect of reform on the
efficiency of the hospitals (23)
We have seen that reform of rural health insur-
ance did not have any clear influence on the effi-
ciency of the hospitals. Did drug reform enable the
hospitals to perform any better?
The results show that the efficiency of THs re-
mains low. On average, they could actually improve
their efficiency (that means delivering more ser-
vices) by at least 40% without using more re-
sources. Furthermore, the reform seems rather to
have had a negative effect on their technical effi-
ciency, the average of which declined over the period studied (2009-2012).
In addition, a greater number of hospitals had an efficiency score equal to
60 or less (Graph 9, which likewise shows a lower average score). This is
partly explained by the fact that in the greater part of the hospitals in our
sample, the increase in subsidies more than made up for the loss of re-
sources from the sale of medicine, creating what is generally called a situ-
ation of “soft budget constraint” mentioned previously. In fact, the
arrangement permitting the awarding of subsidies, when compared with
the previous situation, allows township hospitals to reduce their deficit, (24)
all things being equal, without having to make any particular effort to do
so. It would seem, as we have emphasised already, that efforts to invest
were somewhat disproportionate to needs, just as the recruitment of non-
quota staff was left to the initiative of the hospitals. We also noted that
some hospitals intensified the delivery of profitable activities (injections,
laboratory tests, sonar scans, etc.). It is therefore quite likely that the cost
of care borne by patients has fallen less than it might have done. 
That said, it is not certain that this situation has restrained growth of de-
mand in township hospitals compared to what it might have been other-
wise. There is in fact a strong demand and a willingness to pay for such
services, as we highlighted. If this care had not been provided by township
hospitals, some of the demand would have been transferred to district hos-
pitals. Therefore, behind the hospitals’ strategic and opportunist behaviour,
where it exists, there remains a central question concerning regulation,
namely the lack of precise instructions for the implementation and control
of evidence-based protocols. As in the previous examples, all this demon-
strates that reform has not had the expected results in terms of the tech-
nical efficiency of the hospitals, which have adapted their strategies by
focusing more on lucrative activities.
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22. Owing to a lack of data, preventive activity, apart from vaccinations, could not be analysed. Our
discussions with the hospital directors and the staff in charge of prevention suggest that the new
public health initiatives are very time-consuming. It would seem that staff devote a great deal of
time to keeping individual health records and making preventive home visits to deal with elderly
people who are reluctant to undergo health checks when they “are not ill,” and who do not turn
up for their hospital appointments.
23. Laurène Petitfour, Xiezhe Huangfu, Martine Audibert, and Jacky Mathonnat, “Estimating and Ex-
plaining the Efficiency of Township Hospitals in Shandong Province in the Context of the Drug
Policy Reform,” Études et Documents, No. 17, 2015.
24. The majority of hospitals are in deficit every year.
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Conclusion
Soon after its so-called economic liberalisation, the Chinese government
found itself facing a dysfunctional health system. Having momentarily with-
drawn from that system, it decided in the early 2000s to undertake a range
of reforms and to become more involved financially, particularly in linking
the reforms of 2003 to health insurance in rural areas and in compensating
hospitals for the loss of income imposed on them by the pharmaceutical
reform of 2009.
Although the reforms have borne impressive fruits in certain respects, they
have not led to the expected results in others, which continue to preoccupy
the authorities.
Apart from the truly remarkable take-off of the NRCMS, which in 2015
covered about 99% of the rural population, the first positive aspect to which
the two series of reforms have contributed has been to give a strong boost
to the tendency emerging from the early 2000s with regard to increasing
the activity of the township hospitals. This has put the brakes on
the overloading of hospitals at the higher levels. Without these re-
forms – and especially, without any doubt, the insurance reform –
increased activity in the township hospitals would have been far
lower and more heterogeneous than what we have seen.
The second positive outcome, largely due to the pharmaceutical
reform (and one of its goals), has been the spectacular drop in the
cost of medicines. In parallel with this, the government has agreed
to a remarkable effort to compensate township hospitals for the
consequent loss of income by significantly increasing the subsidies
granted to them. But that very decision has encouraged, to varying
extents, the moral hazard behaviour of the THs, as we have empha-
sised.
The third positive result is that there has been improvement in
the way the NRCMS handle patients’ interests: insurance reim-
bursements for sickness have greatly increased (rates and amounts),
together with the moderating effect of the pharmaceutical policy
on the cost of medicines. These latter two results have helped con-
siderably in lowering financial barriers to access to healthcare. But
the drop in the number of households facing major health expenditures
(“catastrophic costs”) is probably smaller than expected. A study by
Wagstaff and Yu shows that in Gansu Province, households now covered by
health insurance for a list of specified treatments are seeking treatments
whether they are covered or not, which they would have avoided in the ab-
sence of an insurance scheme. (25) One consequence has been an increase
in private health expenditure, creating in some cases a counter-intuitive but
not paradoxical link between the development of the insurance scheme and
a large increase in costs borne privately by households. But there is no ev-
idence of a nation-wide magnitude of this kind of situation. 
Despite the aforementioned positive results of the reforms, however, there
are still two major problems that they have not been able to resolve.
The first is the quality of health care. Admittedly, our studies do not allow
us to prejudge the effect of the reforms on the quality of prescriptions or
of the care delivered, because our lack of data meant that we could not
take them into account. That said, however, our interlocutors tell us that
care quality has actually improved with the reforms, albeit unequally. In
general, major underlying problems still persist, creating major public dis-
content. In extreme cases, this has led to acts of violence towards medical
staff in different parts of the country. (26) It is difficult to know the extent of
this problem, but it is taken very seriously by the health authorities and by
the Party. Moreover, patients have become increasingly demanding and are
attracted by hi-tech treatments, and this has led certain establishments to
develop strategies of investment in top-of-the-range technology, enabling
them to increase their income even when it is not always clear that there
is any gain in care quality for the patient.
The second problem is that the efficiency of the hospitals has remained
low, and even deteriorated over the final years of the study, partly because
a number of them suffered from overcapacity, (27) and partly because the 
25. Adam Wagstaff and S. Yu, “Do Health Sector Reforms have their Intended Impacts? The World
Bank’s Health VIII Project in Gansu Province, China,” Journal of Health Economics, Vol. 26, No. 3,
2005, pp. 505-535.
26. According to our interviewees at the National Health and Family Planning Commission.
27. We believe that there is a need to reconsider the health map by matching some township hos-
pitals and reducing the size of some others. But this issue has turned out to be very sensitive. It
has both an administrative dimension (complying with the current standards) and an eminently
political character.
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Graph 7 – Income from medicines sold through external 
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Graph 8 – Evolution and distribution of the num-
ber of daily hospitalisations between 2006 and
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Source: Authors’ calculations. To interpret this chart, see the note for Graph 6.
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reforms contributed to a soft budget constraint for the THs. In addition,
the system still works in a very bureaucratic manner. The managers are
not really in a position to manage their establishments, and they are not
sufficiently incentivised to do so. So there are questions to be asked
about rearranging the incentives in order to improve efficiency, which is
a very real preoccupation of the directors of the National Health and
Family Planning Commission.
The authorities are well aware that these points need improvement.
Over recent years some new initiatives have been launched, including
the introduction of staff incentives based on results and performance
criteria. Contracts specifying targets (performance) have been signed, in-
cluding some with doctors in village clinics. But their incentivising char-
acter and the way they are implemented is not always very clear in the
light of what we have observed. An increasing role has been also given
to the private sector in order to favour some kind of regulated compe-
tition between providers. These approaches, which are going in the right
direction, are directly related to the goal of improving the quality of care
and the health of the population.
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Graph 9 – Income from medicines sold through 
external consultations and through hospitalisation










1. Analysing efficiency: 
The non-parametric approach
Two approaches, the parametric and the non-parametric, enable the
technical efficiency of the units of production to be assessed. The non-
parametric approach is the one used to assess the efficiency of hospitals
because, unlike the parametric, it does not presuppose any a priori speci-
fication of the form of productive function (a form that is unknown in the
field of healthcare). The assessment of that function is therefore guided
by the data. (28)
Among the different methods available for the assessment of efficiency,
our studies have made use of two: Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and
partial frontier analysis. Both of them are based on mathematical pro-
gramming. The measure of technical efficiency is established by compar-
ing production with the resources used. The units of production are then
compared with each other. If the objective is to minimise resources, the
units of production that use the least resources for a production identical
to others (input orientation model) are classified as efficient and are lo-
cated at the frontier of production. If the objective is to maximise pro-
duction, the units of production that produce the greatest number of
goods or services for a quantity of resources identical to others (output
orientation model) are classified as efficient and are located at the fron-
tier of production. The other units of production are classified as ineffi-
cient and are located beneath the frontier and at a greater or lesser
distance from the frontier according to the gap between them and the
efficient units. The value of the measure of efficiency (called the score) is
contained between 1 (units of production that are efficient and on the
frontier) and 0 (totally inefficient units of production). Every value con-
tained between these two limits measures the distance from the unit of
production to the frontier. In more concrete terms, a score of 0.7 (0.4)
shows that the unit of production could increase its output by 30% (60%)
with the same quantity of available resources. These methods integrate
equally the hypotheses of constant return to scale (when production in-
creases in proportion to the variation in resources) or variable yields
(when production increases more or less than proportionately to the vari-
ation in resources).
The order-m partial frontier analysis (29) differs from the DEA method in
that it assesses the efficiency by simulating several samples of m units of
production, comprising units that have at most the same output quantities
(output orientation model) using at least the same input quantities (input
orientation model). For each simulated sample, an efficiency score is as-
signed to each unit of production. The procedure is repeated n times, then
the mean score of all those simulations becomes the order-m score. This
method authorises certain units of production to be above the production
frontier (with a score above 1, they are considered super-efficient). When
panel data are available, DEA allows the Malmquist Index to be calculated,
which measures a change, between two periods, in the total productivity
of the factors and allows technical progress to be isolated from pure tech-
nical efficiency. Technical progress measures a change of the frontier of
production and shows that an improvement in technical efficiency is due
to technological innovations rather than to management decisions, unlike
pure technical efficiency, which shows that an improvement in technical
efficiency is due to improved management.
2. Constructing the composite indexes
2a. The composite activity index through the Coca
method
Hospital activity is multi-faceted, particularly in the hospitals we have
studied, and it includes curative and preventive activities. The aim of the
reforms is to improve the efficiency of the hospitals, but without damaging
28. Abraham Charnes, William Cooper, Arie Lewin, and Leopold Seiford, Data Envelopment Analysis:
Theory, Methodology and Applications, London, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995. 
29. Catherine Cazals, Jean-Pierre Florens, and Léopold L. Simar, “Nonparametric Frontier Estimation:
A Robust Approach,” Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 106, 2002, pp. 1-25. 
ANNEXES
the functions they are expected to perform. Even if the DEA model allows
us to consider a production function with several outputs, their number
has to be kept to a minimum, particularly since the sample of hospitals in
the study is not very large. As the strategy of hospitals varies, some of
them choosing to respond to the whole of their remits while others focus
on the profitable activities, it has been necessary to take all the activities
into consideration. This has led us to devise two composite indexes (one
for curative activities and the other for preventive activities) by recourse
to calculations based on the equivalent work load, as recommended by
Coca. (30) In order to allow for local particularities, our calculations make
use of the weightings proposed and discussed by a committee of Chinese
experts (see Table 1 below):
2b. Composite index with main component analysis
When there are several variables representing a resource (equipment,
for example), the question arises whether each kind of equipment
should be entered into the model as separate variables or in the form
of an aggregate indicator. The aggregate form is the one more usually
adopted in works on hospitals. Several studies estimate the value of the
total equipment by adding up the monetary value of each kind of equip-
ment. This approach has several drawbacks. Firstly, it is difficult to es-
tablish the purchase price of old equipment. Secondly, should one
consider the price of such goods at the moment of the study or at the
time of their purchase? Thirdly, two hospitals might find themselves in
possession of an item with the same monetary value but of a different
type, which might have a different effect on their activity. In fact, mon-
etary value does not fully reflect the technological use value of a piece
of medical equipment.
The principal component analysis remedies some of these drawbacks.
Its aim is to reduce the number of initial variables by bringing them
down to a reduced space while distorting the real situation as little as
possible. Relying on an approach combining the geometrical (calculation
of distances) and the statistical (matrix of variances and co-variances),
it consists of generating k new variables (one or two, for example) as a
linear combination of the p initial variables, which leads to a minimal
loss of information. These new variables are called the principal com-
ponents.
- The composite index of equipment
The initial variables for the equipment taken into consideration are the
number of X-ray machines, echographers, endoscopes, and electrocardio-
grams in each hospital. So a new variable is then generated as an equip-
ment index with values from 0 (for the least equipped hospital) to 100
(for the most fully equipped).
- The composite index of global activity
The activity variables taken into consideration are the number of external
consultations, hospitalisations, emergencies, surgical operations, laboratory
tests, vaccinations, and pre-natal consultations.
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30. Elias Coca, Les inégalités entre hôpitaux : Obstacle à l’efficacité et à l’équité de la maîtrise des
dépenses hospitalières (Inequalities among hospitals: An obstacle to efficiency and equity in
mastering hospital expenditures), Paris, Berger-Levrault, 1995.
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